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 Abstract:  
Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the recent release of the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper affirm the Government’s commitment 
toward carbon emissions reduction and the advancement of the environmental cause. 
Using a naïve model which maximises the environmental cause at the expense of 
financial impact on the economy, this paper highlights how the failure of the first 
phase of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme can be attributed to the 
over-relaxation of parameters crucial to the success of the scheme as measured by 
verified reduction in emissions. The Government’s preferred position as elucidated in 
the Green Paper is then contrasted in this context to illustrate the possible sources of 
failure that are currently engendered in the Scheme. The implementation of the 
Scheme will impose great compliance costs on the economy – we argue that the 
Government’s over zealous protection of business interests may ultimately lead to 
failure of the Scheme, in which case the businesses and community would have 
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verified reduction in emissions. The Government’s preferred position as elucidated in 
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Scheme will impose great compliance costs on the economy – we argue that the 
Government’s over zealous protection of business interests may ultimately lead to 
failure of the Scheme, in which case the businesses and community would have 





As more scientific research produce evidence that reinforce the negative impact 
greenhouse gasses have on climate change, the knee-jerk solution is to reduce the total 
emission of these gasses globally. These gasses are collectively termed as “carbon-
equivalent” or just “carbon” for simplicity in definition and measurement. The Kyoto 
Protocol is tasked with the objective of reducing global carbon emissions and sets 
short and long term reduction trajectories accordingly. Each country signatory is then 
mandated to reduce its emissions in line with these trajectories.  
 
Australia’s recent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent release of the 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) Green Paper signal the Rudd 
Government’s firm commitment toward carbon pollution control and environmental 
protection. In developing the Green Paper, the Government relies on several key 
sources for information and feedback, including the Garnaut Climate Change Review 
(commissioned by the Government), the National Emissions Trading Taskforce, the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”) and other schemes that are 
already in operation in certain Australian states and territories as well as elsewhere in 
the world. 
 
The implications of this significant step are immense for Australian businesses, 
particularly pollution emitters, and while the economy as a whole is expected to be 
affected, the precise potential financial impact is an unknown factor which is unable 
to be reliably measured. Achieving the environmental aim and minimising the 
economic impact at the same instance are two rather separate objectives made even 
more difficult by their inherent inverse relationship with each other. Needless to say, 
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it is imperative that the Australian CPRS works to not only reduce carbon pollution 
over time, but to do so at minimum costs. For these concerns to be met, the CPRS has 
to be well designed with policies well implemented in order to provide as much 
regulatory and financial certainty to businesses and other participants.  
 
Using design assessment criteria specifically stated by the Government, this paper 
highlights several key weaknesses in the Scheme which can potentially contribute to 
its failure. We introduce a naïve model which maximises the environmental objective 
as well as the experience from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme as our 
basis of argument. Our paper is particularly motivated by the failure of reducing 
overall emissions in Europe despite the presence of a scheme since 2005. 
Additionally, this study contributes to the understanding of policy factors which 
influence the outcomes of the scheme, and is therefore helpful to the Australian 
Government which has stated previously that “the Government’s overriding objective 
is to get the design right” (Green Paper Summary, pg.10). The subject matter of this 
study has been received by the Government in the form of a submission and is 
published online.1 
 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the generic ‘cap-n-
trade’ currently used in carbon reduction schemes. Section 3 introduces the naïve 
model which is a cap-n-trade scheme that maximises the environmental cause at the 
expense of economic impact, while section 4 illustrates how the failure of the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme can be attributed to the over relaxation of 
the parameters crucial in determining the success of the scheme. Section 5 
                                                 




summarises Australian Government’s preferred position under the Green Paper 
including design assessment criteria. Section 6 highlights key weakness areas of the 
Scheme which could contribute to its failure. Lastly, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Role of a Generic Emissions Trading Scheme: the Cap–n–Trade 
Approach 
 
For the most effective reduction in pollution output, all carbon emitters would be 
required to reduce their emissions over time according to each signatory country’s 
declared carbon reduction trajectories.2 For an effective reduction in global emissions, 
emitters would have to incur a financial penalty for emission at a price which is costly 
enough to justify investment in comparatively cleaner technologies and/or methods 
resulting in lower actual output of emissions.  
 
In the cap-n-trade approach, all carbon emitters would be required to offset their 
emissions by the use of trading permits either with or without the use of alternative 
carbon offsets. These trading permits are expected to be distributed and/or auctioned 
off to emitters and non-emitters alike at regular intervals provided that the units of 
CO2-e covered in these permits do not exceed the trajectory set by the government. 
The number of permits is therefore set to a “cap”. Each trading permit has definable 
proprietary (both legal and equitable) rights to facilitate the transfer of these rights, 
and is retired upon use to offset a specific amount of emissions3. Accordingly, a 
secondary market in which the trading of carbon permits between market participants 
takes place is expected to exist.  
                                                 
2 Australia has not made such declaration at the time of writing but is scheduled to do so at the end of 
2008. 
3 Currently set at 1 ton of CO2-e gasses. 
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The use of this cap-n-trade approach as the basis of the generic ETS engenders 
multiple objectives. The Green Paper, while unclear with the specifics of an 
Australian ETS, nevertheless signals its intention to adopt the cap-n-trade approach 
rather than a carbon tax.  
 
The Government has stated that the development of the Scheme will be guided by the 
following principles: 
• The scheme will be a 'cap and trade' scheme. That is, it will set an overall 
environmental cap by issuing a set number of permits, and allow entities to 
trade permits, thereby putting a price on carbon. 
• The caps will be designed to place Australia on a low emissions path in a way 
that best manages the economic impacts of transition, while assuring our 
ongoing economic prosperity. 
• The scheme will have maximal coverage of greenhouse gases and sectors, to 
the extent that this is practical. The broader the scheme's coverage, the more 
cost-effectively it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and more fairly 
spread the burden of such reductions across the community. 
• The scheme will be designed to enable international linkages, while ensuring it 
suits Australia's economic conditions. 
• The scheme design will address the competitive challenges facing emission-
intensive trade-exposed industries in Australia. 
• The scheme will also address the impact on strongly-affected industries. 
• Measures will be developed to assist households - particularly low income 
households - to adjust to the impact of carbon prices. 
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It is clear from the above principles that the Government is aware of the need to 
achieve this country’s environmental objective with due consideration to financial 
impact to the economy. Given that the Government is responsible for setting and 
defining the key parameters of the framework in the Scheme, this juggling act is 
ultimately determined by a political process which can be subjected to manipulative 
pressures from other interests.  Setting a cap that is too high for fear of financial 
backlash jeopardises the environmental objective as less pressure is put upon emitters 
to conform; while setting a cap that is too strict on emitters would substantially 
increase the financial impact on the economy. 
 
In highlighting what we argue are potential key deficiencies in the Scheme, for the 
purpose of comparison, we rely on a rudimentary ETS framework which maximises 
the environmental objective but disregards the financial impact it may cause. 
Additionally, we examine the reasons why the EU ETS has failed to reduce overall 
verified emissions during its first phase of operation as basis to illustrate how an 
environmental conservation scheme can fail in this context.  
 
3. The Naïve Model 
As the starting point of our discussion, we introduce a strict ETS model which 
maximises the environmental objective and which, by necessity, ignores its economic 
impact. This ‘naïve’ model is then compared to the carbon pollution reduction 
schemes in Europe and Australia to illustrate our argument that certain elements of 




We envisage this naïve model to utilise the cap-n-trade approach. In our model, 
assuming that the emission limit for a specific year is 1,000 kilo tons of CO2-e gasses, 
then a similar amount will be covered by carbon trading permits, which, if specified at 
1 ton per permit, would equate to 1 million permits. Since no carbon offset is allowed, 
an emitter who emits for example 10 kilo tons of CO2-e gasses per year will be 
required by the regulatory framework to offset its emissions using 10,000 permits. 
The shelf-life of each permit is limited to one year, and all emitters regardless of size 
or industry are covered under this model. All permits are auctioned off in an 
ascending manner with combined amount of CO2-e covered in the permits not 
exceeding the trajectory declared for that year. The financial penalty for non-
compliance is set so impossibly high that it ceases to be an issue. 
 
With a declared set of emission reduction trajectory in place, and given no other 
alternative mean of offsetting emissions beside the use of permits, the supply of 
permits will decrease over time, thereby making scarcity of permits an important 
consideration to emitters. Unless demand for these permits adjusts, the price of carbon 
permits is expected to rise, ceteris paribus.  With the same or increased in output 
production, emitters who do not consider cleaner ways of achieving this level of 
output and/or invest in research & development in cleaner production methodology 
will bear the brunt of the costs of emission. Eventually, the cost of acquiring carbon 
permits will outgrow the cost of reducing actual emissions in this model, in which 
case emitters would have no other choice but to start exploring cleaner ways of 
production, or to reduce production, or shut down completely in the extreme when 
business is not viable given the costs. In any of these scenarios, the environmental 
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objective is maximised at all cost. Any impact on the economy or industry 
competitiveness is considered.  
 
As can be seen, while the naïve model demonstrates how the environmental objective 
is the one and only focus, its lack of consideration of economic and business impact 
renders it an impractical one to implement. Accordingly, it is to be expected that any 
cap-n-trade scheme would be in practice a more relaxed model with better treatment 
of economic and financial costs. However, as next section shows in Europe, the over-
relaxation of the model, as seen in the lenient setting of key parameters in the EU 
scheme, for the purpose of protecting businesses has rendered the EU scheme 
ineffective in combating emissions output. 
 
4. Relaxations of the Naïve Model: Lessons from EU ETS 
No rational government would pursue a strict model such as the one described above. 
The political process is subjected to pressure from various sources, particularly from 
the collective influence of businesses whose interests will not be ignored by 
governments.  
 
Evidence from the EU ETS suggests that companies implement typical project 
selection exercise in determining the cheapest method to offset emissions. That is to 
say, although compliance with the scheme is required by law, emitters would seek the 
most cost-effective way to do so as profitability is arguably a more important factor 
than environmental care. Indeed, the European Commission reported on 23rd May 
2008 that during the first phase of the EU ETS (2005 – 2007), the 24 EU member 
states (not including Romania, Bulgaria and Malta) have achieved a change in 
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verified emissions ranging -20.8% to 28.5%, with an overall increase in emissions by 
1.9% in that period. As can be seen from Table 1, results in emission change range 
widely with Sweden achieving the best result. Finland and Estonia are the worst 
culprits with both increasing emissions by over 20% respectively in that period. 
Clearly, this outcome undermines the intention of their scheme and thus the EU ETS 
has been described as a failure. 
Table 1: Verified Emissions from European Union Members, 2005 – 2007.  
 
This table illustrates the verified emissions of 24 European Union members during the first phase of 




2005 2006 2007 2005-2007
Austria  33,372,826 32,382,804 31,751,165 -4.90%
Belgium 55,363,223 54,775,314 52,795,318 -4.60%
Cyprus 5,078,877 5,259,273 5,396,164 6.20%
Czech Republic 82,454,618 83,624,953 87,834,758 6.50%
Germany 474,990,760 478,016,581 487,004,055 2.50%
Denmark 26,475,718 34,199,588 29,407,355 11.10%
Estonia 12,621,817 12,109,278 15,329,931 21.50%
Spain 183,626,981 179,711,225 186,495,894 1.60%
Finland 33,099,625 44,621,411 42,541,327 28.50%
France 131,263,787 126,979,048 126,634,806 -3.50%
Greece 71,267,736 69,965,145 72,717,006 2.00%
Hungary 26,161,627 25,845,891 26,835,478 2.60%
Ireland 22,441,000 21,705,328 21,246,117 -5.30%
Italy 225,989,357 227,439,408 226,368,773 0.20%
Lithuania 6,603,869 6,516,911 5,998,744 -9.20%
Luxembourg 2,603,349 2,712,972 2,567,231 -1.40%
Latvia 2,854,481 2,940,680 2,849,203 -0.20%
Netherlands 80,351,288 76,701,184 79,874,658 -0.60%
Poland 203,149,562 209,616,285 209,601,993 3.20%
Portugal 36,425,915 33,083,871 31,183,076 -14.40%
Sweden 19,381,623 19,884,147 15,348,209 -20.80%
Slovenia 8,720,548 8,842,181 9,048,633 3.80%
SK  25,231,767 25,543,239 24,516,830 -2.80%
UK  242,513,099 251,159,840 256,581,160 5.80%
  
Total  2,012,043,453 2,033,636,557 2,049,927,884 1.90%
Source: European Commission press release 23rd May 20084. 
                                                 




The first phase of the EU ETS covered approximately 12,000 installations 
representing some 40% of EU CO2 emissions. Under the EU scheme, the EU member 
states agree on national emission caps which have to be approved by the European 
Commission, allocate free allowances to their industrial operators under each 
member’s National Allocation Plan, track and validate the actual emissions against 
the emission caps, and require the allowances to be retired after the end of each year.  
 
There are three lessons from this failure: 
(1) Lax emission reduction targets culminated in unambitious emission caps. This 
suggests a tentative commitment, at best, by EU member countries. With some 
countries achieving a growth in emissions of over 20%, the caps set by most 
EU member states are simply not ambitious enough. Indeed, caps set for the 
power sector are far too lenient compared to other sectors, resulting in 
inequitable carbon reduction requirements. 
(2) The over allocation (as compared to business-as-usual emissions level) of free 
carbon trading permits provided no incentive for businesses to reduce 
emissions. The over allocation of permits occurred in 20 out of the 24 
reporting EU member countries. EU member states have given away under 
their respective National Allocation Plans far too many free allowances to 
their installations, particularly to the power sector which is a major source of 
pollution. Moreover, as Ecofys reported in August 20045, several countries 
have given more allowances than estimated to be needed under business-as-
usual scenario. This implies that no practical effort is necessary to reduce 
emissions in these countries since current level of emissions is more than 
                                                 




enough covered by carbon permits. This was confirmed in May 2006 when 
several carbon registries reported that their industries were given more 
allowances than they could possibly use. The price of carbon emission 
spiralled immediately after, reaching an all time low of €0.03 per ton in 
December 2007.6 With permits trading at super cheap prices, and no issue 
whatsoever with scarcity in terms of the availability of allowances and carbon 
permits, it is not surprising to find that the EU ETS has failed so remarkably. 
(3) The EU ETS allocated free carbon permits to business installations (entities) 
which were significant polluters and thus further undermining the purported 
intentions of their scheme.   
 
While the EU carbon market is overseen by a neutral regulator, the setting of the 
emissions cap and the National Allocation Plan are specific to each government of the 
member states. The failure of the EU scheme due to above factors strongly suggests 
that these governments have been materially influenced by economic and business 
concerns. Indeed, European businesses have manipulated the scheme by passing on 
costs to consumers even though the permits were allocated to them with zero 
consideration.  The International Herald Tribune observed: “the carbon trading system 
has created a multibillion-euro windfall for some of the continent's biggest polluters, 
with little or no noticeable benefit to the environment so far.”7 
 
If governments are reluctant to boldly confront the environmental issue and thus 
directly and/or indirectly undermine the mechanics of an effective carbon scheme as a 
result, we argue that there is no point having an EU ETS in the first place. 
                                                 
6 Prices obtained from the European Energy Exchange, < http://www.eex.com/en> 
7 Kanter, J., 9th December 2008, “EU carbon trading system brings windfalls for some, with little 
benefit to climate”, viewed 12th December 2008 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/12/09/business/windfall.php> 
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Compliance to any form of scheme requires costs, and in this case there is no 
justifying additional financial cost investment without any real credible collective 
effort in achieving the objectives of the scheme. A poorly constructed scheme not 
only fails in meeting the environmental objective but also create an inequitable time-
sink forced upon businesses and households 
5. Australia’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme at a Glance 
The CPRS Green Paper, published by the Department of Climate Change, puts 
forward the Australian Government’s preferred positions on the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme. It is stated that the overall framework of the CPRS is to achieve 
the environmental objective in the most efficient and cost effective way.8 Emissions 
trading is the mechanism of the Scheme, and the framework and design options of the 
Scheme are to be assessed according to the following assessment criteria (Green 
Paper Preferred Positions, pg. 35): 
 
1. Environmental integrity 
2. Economic efficiency 
3. Minimisation of implementation risk 
4. Policy flexibility 
5. Promotion of international objectives 
6. Implications for industry competitiveness 
7. Accountability and transparency 
8. Fairness 
 
                                                 
8 The meaning of efficiency and cost-effectiveness can be subjectively interpreted. In regards to the 
latter, it is interesting to note that this is a departure from the Garnaut Report which used the phrase 
“…to deliver emissions reduction at the lowest possible cost to the domestic economy” (Garnaut 
Report, pg. 321) 
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The major key elements are summarised as follows: 
 The Scheme to start in 2010. All six Kyoto gases to be included. 
 Current coverage is about 1000 operators comprising approximately 70% of 
current Australian emissions. Petrol is included. Possible inclusion of 
agriculture in 2015. 
 Obligation to surrender permits sets at an emission threshold for facilities of 
25kt of CO2-e per annum. 
 Annual emissions cap to be set on a rolling five year basis. 
 A range of assistance mechanisms will be granted to industries most affected 
by the Scheme (known as Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries, or 
EITEs): 
o Activities with emissions intensity above 2kt CO2-e per dollar million 
revenue will at first be granted free permits that cover approximately 
90% per unit of output. Free permits granted will decrease to 60% for 
activities with emissions intensity of 1.5kt CO2-e per dollar million 
revenue. The total amount of free permits given will use approximately 
30% of total available number of permits. 
 Special assistance is also given to Strongly-Affected Industries (SAIs) which 
include coal fired electricity generators. Size of fund to be determined in 
White Paper. 
 A Climate Change Action Fund will be established to fund investment in, inter 
alia, lower carbon technology and to raise awareness for businesses. 
 Australian carbon permits will be auctioned off on a quarterly basis by a 
regulator. 
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 The rights under the permits are fully described and are fully transferrable. 
Equitable interests can be registered against these rights. 
 Legal transfer of the permits possible only via a registry. 
 As these permits will have no use-by date, the unlimited banking of these 
permits will therefore be permitted. An entity may borrow up to 5% of 
emissions units from future years’ caps. 
 A cap on permit price for the period 2010 – 2015 to be set higher than the 
expected market level. 
 Design of the Scheme to be compatible with international schemes thereby 
making market linkages a future possibility. 
 Accounting guidance to be determined by national and international standard 
setters. 
 
In regard to the governance of the Scheme, the Government/Parliament sets the key 
rules such as caps and reduction targets, international links, permit allocation rules 
etc. A Scheme regulator will be established to make independent decisions based on 
rules set in legislation. 
 
As expected, the Green Paper addresses (though not fully) both environmental and 
economic objectives. The Government is now opened for submissions9 for future 
consideration in the development of the Scheme.  
 
As discussed before, the lessons from the EU ETS have proven important in 
suggesting that the setting of the trajectories and caps and the assistance given in the 
                                                 
9 Submission to the Green Paper is now closed. 
 16
form of allowance to industrial operators are both crucial factors in determining the 
success or failure of the Scheme. Australia’s position in this regard is not fully known. 
Indeed it is interesting to note the Government’s willingness to grant assistance 
without properly addressing how the assistance arrangement can help affected 
industries reduce their emissions rather than passing on the costs to consumers. 
Perhaps more importantly, the development of the Green Paper itself suggests a 
political process that is more concerned with business interests since these are 
addressed more explicitly than Australia’s proposed trajectories and caps.  
 
6. Key Weakness Areas of Australia’s Scheme 
As the experience from Europe has shown, good intentions toward environmental 
conservation do not necessarily produce the requisite result.   Indeed, as the Garnaut 
Report (pg. 321) observes, “seemingly small compromises will quickly erode the 
benefits that a well designed emissions trading scheme can provide”.  
 
We detail in this section five areas which we argue are potential shortfalls in 
Australia’s Scheme. While these areas can be individually identified, the respective 
areas are inherently intertwined.  
 
6.1 Government as policy setter 
The crux of this area of weakness is the age-old question of “who governs the 
government”. The determination of crucial parameters in the Scheme is to be made by 
a political process which can be materially influenced by lobby groups pursuing their 
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respective interests or by submissions made by individuals and organisations10. 
Indeed, the Garnaut Report warned against such influence when it observed (on pg. 
343): 
 
“In recent public debate and commentary, it has been apparent that industries 
will seek to influence the design of any such assistance arrangements in ways 
that maximise their respective returns from the scheme. This is to be expected. 
It also signals the scale of the challenge faced by policy makers in not 
becoming distracted by vocal and well organised interests.” 
 
It is important to observe that the Scheme Regulator, while tasked with making 
independent decisions, does so based on rules already set in legislation. Additionally, 
as the Green Paper itself suggests, independent recommendations made by the 
Garnaut Review are not always readily adopted by the Government.11  
 
The setting of critical elements such as the short and long term emissions reduction 
trajectories and the allocation of free permits, inter alia, directly defines the strictness 
of the Scheme, and thereby signals the Government’s intentions in regards to the 
environmental objective, as our naïve model illustrates earlier. While it is not for this 
study to put forward an opinion on this matter, it is interesting to note nevertheless 
that the Government has appeared to have taken a modest stance on emissions 
                                                 
10 A list of submissions made to the Green Paper can be viewed online here: 
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/greenpaper/consultation/submissions.html 
11 Various visible “discrepancies” exist. For example, Garnaut Report recommends that no permit is to 
be freely allocated whereas the Government has signalled its intentions to do so to protect certain 
emissions-intensive industries. 
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reduction targets.12 This is in spite of recent Government’s plan to expand coal 
exports in Newcastle.13 
 
6.2 Links with international schemes 
Linkage with international carbon markets is recommended by the Garnaut Report 
and is also provided for in the Green Paper. The Government has indicated that it is 
carefully calibrating its response in light of international action, and has made the 
minimisation of implementation risk an early priority for the sake of establishing a 
stable/predictable start up. However, this vision is not adequately substantiated by 
more detailed definition of key elements. This creates an added layer of uncertainty to 
businesses as Scheme obligations and other variables may change with the 
introduction of international links. 
 
6.3 Uncertainty on how certain industries are to be protected. 
Emissions intensive industries will be significantly affected by the introduction of the 
Scheme. If no assistance is rendered, these industries would face immediate 
deterioration in profitability, market-share and therefore competitiveness in the 
international setting.  With no effective short-term response to the Scheme14, these 
industries may be forced to relocate their emissions intensive operations away from 
                                                 
12 See for example: Wilkinson, M. , 1st December 2008, “Australia squibs on climate promise”, Sydney 
Morning Herald < http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/climate-promise-
uturn/2008/11/30/1227979844927.html>and Wilkinson, M. and Cubby, B., 10th December 2008, 
“Wong to resist calls for greenhouse cuts”, Sydney Morning Herald. < 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/global-warming/wong-to-resist-calls-for-greenhouse-
cuts/2008/12/09/1228584839266.html> 
13 Sydney Morning Herald, 14th December 2008, “Large targets needed in ETS: Greenpeace”. < 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/global-warming/large-targets-needed-in-ets-
greenpeace/2008/12/14/1229189428795.html> 
14 In the steel industry for example, emissions are inherently unavoidable given the chemical processes 
that are involved in the production of steel. 
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Australia, thus costing jobs to Australia and not creating an impact on reduction of 
global emissions. 
 
The Green Paper acknowledges that emissions intensive industries, such as the EITEs 
and SAIs, should be provided with transitional assistance. For the former, up to 30% 
of total number of permits will be freely allocated. A special fund (not fully defined) 
will be established to assist SAIs. However, crucial questions remain to be answered. 
The Government admits the need to balance support for EITE firms with other 
community interests by adjusting EITE assistance over time to ensure equitable 
contribution. It is also stated however that withdrawal of assistance “depends on 
international developments”, with “thresholds and rates of assistance to be finalised in 
light of additional information”.15  
 
6.4 The issue of scarcity of carbon permits 
The naïve model shows that scarcity is introduced when the number of permits is 
effectively capped if permits have limited shelf-life and are all surrendered at the end 
of the compliance period. Under the proposed Scheme, while the number of permits 
available per year will be capped according to the reduction trajectory, permits will 
however have an indefinite life, are bankable for future use, and limited number of 
permits from future years (called ‘vintage’) can be borrowed for current use. 
Additionally, a carbon bank will be established and empowered to lend limited 
number of permits. These characteristics arguably convolute the issue of scarcity in 
actual practice. It is important to note that scarcity forms the first guiding principle of 
scheme design according to the Ganaut Report, which asserts (at pg. 323) that 
                                                 
15 Green Paper Roadshow Presentation, pg.  25 & 29. 
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“…where the scarcity of permits is uncertain…this will distort resource allocation 
decisions and impose unnecessarily high costs on the economy”. 
 
6.5 Timing of implementation 
The Australian Opposition asserts that the Scheme is too rushed and is in need of 
more extensive consultation with stakeholders.16 It can also be argued that 
implementation of the Scheme should be delayed so that international action on 
climate change can be more readily discerned. Moreover, given the recent credit crisis 
which has affected the world’s economy, and which has lead to depressed business 
and consumer confidence as well as recessions in several developed countries, the 
commencement of the Scheme in 2010 will impose unwelcome costs on a recovering 
Australian economy.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The release of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme reinforces Australia’s 
commitment to emissions reduction and environmental protection.  This paper 
highlights the crucial and inverse relationship between achieving effective carbon 
pollution reduction with minimal costs to businesses and the community, the 
balancing act which is determined by a political process. In doing so, we showed a 
model which maximises the environmental objective (the naïve model) and illustrates 
the failures of the scheme in the European Union where the scheme has been 
extensively relaxed compared to our naïve model for fear of economic backlash. We 
argue that, once committed, the Scheme has to work as a whole in reducing carbon 
emissions for it to justify the compliance and other associated costs on the economy. 
                                                 
16 Joint press conference with Malcolm Turnbull, Leader of the Opposition, and Andrew Robb, shadow 
minister assisting the Leader on Emissions Trading Design. 
<http://www.liberal.org.au/news.php?Id=2302> Accessed 12th December 2008. 
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There are several key areas in the Scheme which we highlighted as potential shortfalls 
which can contribute to the failure of the Scheme. We also show that the Australian 
Government, in its development of the CPRS, has shown more concern toward non-
environmental interests by being more upfront with the assistance available to 
affected industries, and less transparent in regards to setting the carbon reduction 








Department of Climate Change, July 2008, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 



























Joint press conference with Malcolm Turnbull and Andrew Robb, accessed 12th 
December 2008, <http://www.liberal.org.au/news.php?Id=2302>  
 
Kanter, J., 9th December 2008, “EU carbon trading system brings windfalls for some, 
with little benefit to climate”, viewed 12th December 2008 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/12/09/business/windfall.php> 
 




Wilkinson, M., 1st December 2008, “Australia squibs on climate promise”, Sydney 
Morning Herald, < http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/climate-promise-
uturn/2008/11/30/1227979844927.html> 
 
Wilkinson, M. and Cubby, B., 10th December 2008, “Wong to resist calls for 
greenhouse cuts”, Sydney Morning Herald, < 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/global-warming/wong-to-resist-calls-for-
greenhouse-cuts/2008/12/09/1228584839266.html> 
 
 
 
 
 23
